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Globalisation, leading to pressures for convergence and harmonisation of laws, constitutes an 
important factor influencing the modern debate about corporate accountability. Concerns 
about the reach and power of global corporations, their involvement in fraud, economic 
crimes, corruption, health and safety breaches and environmental depredations are reflected 
in the recent appearance of corporate criminal liability on national and international law reform 
agendas. The growth of transnational corporations, the product of the dismantling of 
nationalistic anti-competitive measures and the general deregulation movements in the US 
and other major economies from the 1980s onwards, has transformed the entire architecture 
of legal control of business activities. National, international and supra national political 
institutions and legal regimes are all implicated. This complex environment cannot be properly 
captured in a short comment yet provides the fast moving background to the analysis of 
corporate liability principles. 
 
Many European jurisdictions have, until recently, made no provision for the criminal liability of 
non-human agents, and some still do not. Even in England and Wales (and other common 
law jurisdictions such as the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) where corporate 
bodies have long been subject to the criminal law, it has been a marginal topic,  ignored by 
the major writers and theorists. This short note introduces a ‘conceptual toolkit’ for corporate 
liability and legal reforms in European jurisdictions.  
 
The toolkit 
Three different theories of corporate blameworthiness have competed for attention in the 
common law: the Agency; Identification, and Holistic Models. The first theory is based on the 
principle that a corporation’s employees are its agents. The second theory of blame attribution 
identifies a limited layer of senior officers within the company as its ‘brains’; the company is 
liable for their individual transgressions on the basis that their acts are also the acts of the 
company. Since agency and identification theories both seek, in different ways, to equate 
corporate culpability with that of an individual they can be characterised as derivative forms of 
liability. The Holistic theory, on the other hand, exploits the dissimilarities between individual 
human beings and group entities; it seeks to locate corporate blame in the procedures, 
operating systems or culture of a company. English law draws on the first theory only in 
relation to strict liability (mainly regulatory) offences; for crimes requiring proof of a mental 
element, the second much more restricted identification theory has applied. In the United 
States the federal courts broke away at the turn of the last century to a more general reliance 
on the first, vicarious theory. In neither jurisdiction has the history been straightforward. Other 
common law jurisdictions, including many American states, mainly follow the English 
bifurcated approach. The third way, the Holistic Theory, is deployed for Commonwealth 
(federal) offences in Australia, and is seen also in the proposed corporate killing offence in 
England. The Table below maps the broad application of these somewhat fluid categories in 
selected common law jurisdictions.  
 
If the role of liability is to induce the corporation as principal to monitor its agents, then what 
should happen to a corporation which does so diligently?  The conceptual dividing line 
between organisational culture theories and due diligence is not necessarily a sharp one. Due 
diligence may form part of the substantive formula or operate at the stage of decision to 
prosecute (as happens particularly with regulatory offences in England and Wales) or at the 
sentence stage as in the US federal scheme. 
 
Developments in Europe 
 
While most civil law systems long eschewed corporate liability, the debate is no longer 
whether to have corporate liability but what form it should take. The traditional objection to 
penal responsibility of legal persons in  German criminal law culture has begun to crumble. In 
most jurisdictions administrative sanctions are gradually being replaced by direct criminal 
(penal) provisions.  Not that the aversion was ever shared by all European jurisdictions; it was 
strongest amongst Germany, Italy, and Spain. Jurisdictions across Northern Europe such as 
the Netherlands and Denmark have adopted a pragmatic approach for some considerable 
time. 
 
An amendment to the Netherlands Criminal Code in 1976 stated that corporations may 
commit offences such as battery and involuntary manslaughter. The criteria for liability are 
whether the company had the power to determine whether the employee did or did not do the 
act in question, and whether it usually 'accepted' such acts. The Dutch power and acceptance 
principle is clearly not as broad as the vicarious principle, nor is it as narrow as identification 
theory.   
 
In the 1980s and 90s Norway, France, and Finland all incorporated criminal punishments 
against enterprises in their new penal codes, and Denmark consolidated  its existing provision 
which is based on a negligence standard. The French Penal Code was amended in 1991 to 
remove the general principle that liability could not attach to personnes morales (i.e. non 
human entities). All sorts of exceptions to the presumption against liability had developed in 
the context of individual (non - penal code) statutes and, as in England, strict liability offences 
were enforced vicariously against corporations. The reformed Code states that legal entities 
may be liable if the offence provision specifically declares that they should be and if an 
employee or officer is shown to have acted on the corporation’s behalf. The actions of ‘rogue’ 
employees would not be imputed to the corporate entity. Sanctions under the new provisions 
include fines, dissolution, and probation. Fines may be up to three times higher than those 
imposed on a natural person. 
 
In Germany (and countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Poland inspired by 
German doctrines) the imposition of criminal liability on legal entities was ‘unthinkable’ until 
very recently. However, this is a matter under active debate in many and Portugal, for 
example, introduced a limited exception to this in the new Penal Code of 1983. The traditional 
objection to penal responsibility of legal persons in German criminal law culture has also 
begun to crumble. Fewer theorists now subscribe to the view that the social and ethical 
disapproval inherent in criminal punishment makes no sense when applied to a corporation.  
 
Overcoming both of these objections, Italy has introduced in 2002 ‘administrative’ liability for a 
limited number of offences. Evidence of ‘structural negligence’ is established if the 
organisation fails to implement adequate structures and guidelines to counter the risk of 
specific offences being committed. The Italian law places the onus of proving diligence on the 
corporation in relation to offences by the officers or chief executive but in relation to offences 
by subordinates the burden is on the prosecution. In either case corporations cannot evade 
liability by blaming the aberrance of individual officers or employees if there is no preventive 
structure in place. 
 
In summary, most European jurisdictions have introduced sanctions in a variety of forms, 
particularly against violations of administrative regulations, similar to regulatory regulatory  
offences in England or the United States. These administrative sanctions are gradually being 
replaced by direct criminal (penal) provisions or by a pragmatic hybrid system, as in Italy. 
These European civil law developments display a new willingness to move towards corporate 
liability and reflect cultural shifts in jurisdictions which have until recently been extremely 
reluctant to contemplate group liability because of its historical association with repressive 
regimes. Because these jurisdictions have come late to corporate liability they are in a 
position to develop principles that are less hide-bound than those in the common law 
countries.  
 
[Drawn from papers presented at conferences: University of Parma Verso Codice Penale 
Modello Per L’Europa la Parte Generale’ (2000), Foundation Ius et Lex, Warsaw Penal 
Responsibility in Liberal Democratic Systems (2002)] 
 
TABLE 1 COMMON LAW VARIATIONS – A BROAD TYPOLOGY 
AGENCY PRINCIPLE IDENTIFICATION DOCTRINE HOLISTIC THEORY 
 
US - federal offences 
(including mens rea) 
South Africa 
Pure Form 
Selected US state 
offences 
Modified Form 
US Model Penal 
Code states 
 
 
 
England -regulatory (strict 
liability and hybrid 
offences)  
England– all other 
offences 
 
England – some 
statutory offences 
 
England and Wales –
proposed corporate 
killing offence 
Australian states- strict 
liability offences 
Australian states   Australia - Federal Law 
New Zealand - regulatory 
strict liability offences 
New Zealand – other 
offences 
New Zealand - 
regulatory non 
strict liability 
offences 
 
 
